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BACKGROUND 
Privacy is the freedom from unauthorized intrusion 
(Zhou et al., 2019). The unauthorized intrusion may occur 
locally or remotely. Remote privacy violations often occur via 
communication and information systems such as the 
internet after data breaches or unintended disclosure of 
personal information (Rendina & Mustanski, 2018). There 
are various approaches for preventing remote privacy 
violations, such as user education (e.g., never post sensitive 
personal information on the internet) and instituting security 
measures such as user authentication and data encryption   
(Kazatzopoulos et al., 2009; Maglogiannis et al. 2009; 
Martinez-Perez et al., 2015; Morera et al., 2016; Shafique et 
al., 2017; Smith et al., 2017). Local privacy violations are 
committed by people around a person; these are 
accomplished in various ways, including asking private 
questions, using personal items without authorization, 
viewing the person’s internet browsing history on his or her 
personal computer or mobile device, and observing a 
person during private activities such as using a mobile 
health (mHealth) app (Boyles et al., 2012).  
While providing security protection to personal health 
data is possible by using some security measures in 
mHealth apps, it is challenging to prevent local privacy 
violations in this field. One reason is because many mHealth 
apps have names including the target disorder, for instance, 
AIDSinfo, HIV & Pregnancy, Depression CBT, and PTSD 
Coach. Therefore, it is very easy for people around the app 
user to determine the nature of the app simply based on the 
app name alone. Moreover, while some mHealth apps may 
have more generic names, for instance, Talking Points, Life 
Check, Mood Tracker, and Mood Log, these apps are 
designed for one single purpose or disease. Therefore, a 
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quick search of such app names on the internet reveals the 
nature and purpose of the app.  
In both cases, the name of the app can trigger a local 
privacy violation even though others may not know whether 
the person uses the app or what contents have been 
entered into the app. This local privacy violation is based on 
the assumption that it is unlikely for people without any of 
these problems to have installed these apps on their phone, 
as indicated in one comment from a study participant in a 
previous study (Zhang et al., 2019):  
“People will think only HIV infected individuals use the 
app, and my friend may doubt if I am HIV infected and may 
keep away from me.”  
 In other words, the existence of these apps on a 
person’s mobile device can trigger a local privacy violation, 
even if other people may not see the users’ private data, 
which may be well protected by various types of security 
measures.  
Because of such local privacy violations, many users 
have expressed privacy concerns when they use mHealth 
apps to manage their own health despite the existence of 
various security measures within mHealth apps themselves 
(Atienza et al., 2015; Goldenberg et al., 2014; Kao & 
Liebovitz, 2017; Kenny et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2012). 
Security and privacy concerns about mHealth apps are 
greater when the apps are for issues associated with 
stigma, social isolation, or discrimination such as HIV 
(human immunodeficiency virus) infection, sexual 
orientation, and mental disorders (Atienza et al., 2015; Di 
Matteo et al., 2018; Goldenberg et al., 2014; Goldenberg et 
al., 2015; Kenny et al., 2016; Proudfoot et al., 2010). 
Therefore, although mHealth apps can be very helpful for 
making health assessment and therapy more accessible, 
efficient, and portable (Kao & Liebovitz, 2017; Nussbaum et 
al., 2019), if mHealth apps violate the privacy of app users, 
some users may choose not to use these apps (Atienza et 
al., 2015). 
Specific to mental disorders, people with mild or 
moderate conditions may not have very obvious 
demonstrated symptoms but may mainly be experiencing a 
change in internal feelings such as an increase in 
hopelessness, sadness, or guilt (Beck et al., 1988; Kroenke 
et al., 2001; Radloff, 1977). Other people around those with 
mild or moderate mental disorders may not be able to easily 
tell whether these people have mental disorders. Similarly, 
people may have HIV infection but without any identifying 
symptoms (e.g., ones significantly different from a typical 
viral infection) for years (Feinberg & Keeshin, 2017). 
Among those who have a stigma-associated disease 
but no obvious symptoms, different people make different 
choices in terms of sharing their own health information. 
Some choose to share their health problem with the people 
around them, such as family members, friends, classmates, 
and co-workers (Atienza et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2019). 
Some choose to deal with their condition themselves and to 
keep their condition private. The latter group of people may 
consider using mHealth apps to assess and manage their 
condition (Crookston et al., 2017; Reid et al., 2013; 
Schueller et al., 2018; Switsers et al., 2018). However, they 
face a difficult choice related to the local privacy violation 
mentioned earlier. That is, they do not want other people 
around them to know that they have a silent health problem, 
but just having mHealth apps for this health problem on their 
mobile devices may reveal that information.  
To protect their privacy, these people typically have two 
choices: either to not use mHealth apps to manage the 
health problem even though they may benefit from them, or 
to devise their own way to protect their local privacy (e.g., 
installing the app only when needed, or creating folders and 
hiding the app in those folders). These options may not 
provide the protection strength they desire and might 
introduce unnecessary inconvenience. A strong but 
convenient privacy protection method embedded in mHealth 
apps so that people may use these apps without any privacy 
concerns would be useful for these people.  
PREVIOUS WORK 
In previous studies where researchers collected 
opinions about mHealth apps from people with mental 
disorders or HIV infection (Goedel et al., 2017; Goldenberg 
et al., 2014, 2015; Lipschitz et al., 2019; Proudfoot et al., 
2010), results indicated that many desired the ability to 
obtain more information for their health needs via mHealth 
apps but had serious concerns about their privacy. 
Participants further revealed that due to these privacy 
concerns, they were hesitant to use mHealth apps for their 
health information seeking or health care self-management. 
The following briefly summarizes these previous studies. 
 Proudfoot et al. conducted an online survey (n=525), 
focus group discussions (n=47), and interviews (n=20) to 
investigate community attitudes towards adopting a mobile 
phone for mental health monitoring and management. The 
results indicated that people with depression, anxiety, or 
stress showed significantly stronger interest in this type of 
monitoring and management (p<.001), but they also 
expressed concern about intrusiveness and lack of privacy 
because of the monitoring activity. The authors mainly 
reported local privacy concerns from study participants and 
indicated some possible solutions, such as requiring user 
authentication, and providing alterable contents so that the 
monitoring could be used on public transportation (Proudfoot 
et al., 2010).  
Goldenberg et al. (2014, 2015) performed focus group 
studies to determine the preferences of Men who have Sex 
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participants expressed interest in this app; however, they 
also expressed local and remote privacy concerns. In one 
study (Goldenberg et al., 2014), there were 38 MSM in the 
focus group discussions. In the other study (Goldenberg et 
al., 2015), there were 9 MSM in two phases of focus groups. 
Specific to local privacy concerns, study participants 
suggested that the app developers be “careful about icons 
and language, so that if others were to gain access to an 
app user’s phone, they would not identify what the app is” 
(Goldenberg et al., 2014). The following are some 
quotations from the participants in the study, which clearly 
indicated their local privacy concerns: “I could imagine if 
someone gets an HIV positive result, they’re not going to 
want that to be something that oh, my little sister picks up 
my phone and sees this. So I would just be very thoughtful 
about how you designed those features…I think that would 
be critical to make sure that that’s done in a way that 
minimizes the risk of any type of exposure that people don’t 
want.” “I’ve had friends outed on various social media and 
apps and so even just having the icon of Grindr on 
someone’s phone, it’s a very distinct tell…I can only imagine 
if I wasn’t out that would be something that I would be very 
concerned [about]. I don’t know if I would keep an app like 
that on my phone at all, just because I wouldn’t want to be 
found.” “I think the wording of [push notifications] would be 
pretty important not to have anything about HIV testing or 
something pop up on your screen. Your phone could be 
wherever.” “I am oftentimes in meetings and it’s often me 
who’s projecting up on a giant computer. The last thing I 
want is the schedule plus alert saying that it’s time for me to 
get an AIDS test.” 
Goedel et al. (2017) performed a web-based survey to 
determine MSM’s willingness to use mHealth apps for HIV 
prevention. In total, 169 MSM in London responded the 
survey. More than 60% (108/169, 63.9%) reported 
willingness to use a mHealth app for HIV testing reminders. 
The authors also mentioned desired features in terms of 
local privacy protection.  
Lipschitz et al. (2019) did a cross-sectional survey study 
to investigate patients’ interest in and barriers to adoption of 
mHealth apps for depression and anxiety. In total, 149 
patients returned the survey. Most (87/149, 73.1%) reported 
interest in using an app for mental illness, but only 16 
(10.7%) had done so. One of the most frequent concerns 
related to using an app for mental illness was data privacy 
(88/149, 59.1%).  
Krebs and Duncan (2015) conducted a cross-sectional 
survey of mobile phone users throughout the United States. 
The results indicated that 427 study participants 
downloaded and used mobile health apps but stopped using 
some of these apps. Among these study participants, 29.0% 
(124/427) “did not like mobile health apps shared their data 
with friends,” which is a concern about local privacy.    
 
Zhang et al. (2019) performed qualitative semi-
structured interviews with 19 young MSM in China to 
determine their preferences for an HIV prevention mobile 
phone app. In this study, privacy was frequently mentioned, 
and the participants’ concern was about local privacy with 
suggestions being related to the name and logo of the app. 
They did not want to have a gay-identified or HIV-identified 
app name or logo since that name or logo may cause 
“unintentional disclosure of the user’s sexual orientation, or 
mistaken by others that the user is HIV infected” (Zhang et 
al., 2019). 
It is worth noting that all the app users’ privacy 
concerns are legitimate. In recent years, a large number of 
security breaches and privacy violations have been 
mentioned on the daily news and on government websites 
(Office for Civil Rights-US Department of State, 2019). 
However, many current mHealth apps do not provide 
sufficient protection of app users’ data. For example, Grundy 
et al. (2019) performed traffic, content, and network analysis 
to investigate the data sharing practices of 24 selected 
mHealth apps. The results indicated that 19 of the 24 apps 
(79%) shared user data with various entities such as app 
developers, the vendor of the app, service providers, cloud 
service providers, and companies performing data analytics. 
The users of these apps may be aware of some of this 
sharing, but it is unlikely they are aware of all of them. 
To encourage people with a strong interest in mHealth 
apps to actually use them, that is, to overcome their concern 
about data privacy, both remotely and local, one approach is 
to include user preferred privacy protection methods in 
mHealth apps. In this work, we specifically focus on gaining 
information about user preferences with regard to methods 
for preventing local privacy violations.  
OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this study was to determine mHealth app 
users’ preferred local privacy protection methods and the 
reason for their preferences. The results can guide mHealth 
app developers to create apps with desired privacy 
protection, which may then motivate more people to adopt 
mHealth apps for their own health management, especially 
those who are currently experiencing the dilemma of 
wanting to use mHealth apps because without them, they 
miss the opportunity of obtaining desired information for 
their own health, yet at the same time not wanting to use 
them because of concerns about local privacy associated 
with mHealth apps.   
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STUDY PROCEDURE  
To identify the app users’ preferred local privacy 
protection method, we needed to use mHealth apps that 
handle data with a certain level of sensitivity. After all, if 
there are no sensitive data in the apps, there is no need for 
privacy protection. In this study, the sensitive data are the 
mental health information in mHealth apps. We recruited a 
group of people with mild or moderate depression to use 
these mental health related apps and express their 
preferences for local privacy protection methods in the apps. 
The results, however, may be applied to apps related to 
other type of health problems, such as HIV infection. The 
following is a brief step-by-step description of the entire 
study procedure 
STEP 1: IDENTIFICATION OF MULTIPLE 
PRIVACY PROTECTION METHODS  
In this step, we determined five privacy protection 
methods (M1, M2, M3, M4, and M5) with different levels of 
privacy protection strength in mHealth apps.  
STEP 2: RECRUITING AND SCREENING OF 
STUDY PARTICIPANTS  
A study advertisement was posted on a website to 
recruit study participants. Every potential study participant 
was screened using the Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approved selection criteria (University of Pittsburgh IRB 
protocol ID: PRO18020101). A group of eligible study 
participants was invited to participate in the study. The study 
was performed in a locked conference room. Only the 
investigators (LZ and BP) and one study participant were in 
the room during each study session.  
STEP 3. SIGNING OF THE CONSENT FORM  
Before the study commenced with a participant, they 
were given the opportunity to read and sign the IRB 
approved consent form. Study participation was completely 
voluntary, and the participants could leave the study at any 
time. 
STEP 4. INTRODUCTION OF 
PARTICIPANTS TO THE STUDY  
At the beginning of the study, the investigators 
explained the purpose of the study, the procedure to be 
followed, and what data would be collected in the study.  
STEP 5. DEMONSTRATION OF THE FIVE 
PRIVACY PROTECTION METHODS  
After the study introduction, the investigators 
demonstrated the five privacy protection methods (M1-M5) 
used in several mHealth apps.  
STEP 6. FILLING OUT OF THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
The study participants were then asked to fill out a 
questionnaire that elicited demographic information, their 
perceived privacy protection level (PPPL) for the five 
presented privacy protection methods, their preference 
rating for each method, and the methods they typically used 
to protect their local privacy. The questionnaire was 
administered on a 10-inch iPad via the web-based Qualtrics 
system.  
STEP 7. INTERVIEW  
A few interview questions were asked after these study 
participants finished the questionnaire to collect more 
detailed information about the rationale behind their 
preference ratings and obtain general comments and 
suggestions on the privacy protection methods used in 
mHealth apps.  
STEP 8. DATA ANALYSIS  
The collected data was summarized and analyzed to 
draw conclusions. Further details of each step in the study 
are provided in the following sections.  
FIVE PRIVACY PROTECTION METHODS  
The following paragraphs describe five different privacy 
protection methods with varying privacy protection strength. 
The first two are widely used in many mHealth apps and 
briefly mentioned in the Introduction section. The third is 
also currently available in some existing multi-module 
mHealth apps, such as iMHere 1.0 (Parmanto et al., 2013). 
The last two methods have been newly introduced into the 
iMHere 2.0 system (Bendixen, et al., 2017; Setiawan et al., 
2019) and are not currently used in other mHealth apps.  
Method 1 (M1): mHealth apps are named after the 
name of the target disorder. This is very convenient for 
marketing purposes as many potential app users may be 
able to easily find these apps using a keyword search in 
major app stores. However, M1 has the weakest privacy 
protection strength (no protection at all) since it is very easy 
for people around the app user to determine the nature of 
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Method 2 (M2): mHealth apps have a more generic 
name but are designed for a single purpose.  M2 is stronger 
than M1 in terms of privacy protection since one cannot 
easily determine the nature of the app by its name, but it 
may not be sufficient for some users or to protect highly 
sensitive health information since a quick search on the 
internet can determine the purpose of the apps. 
To provide stronger local privacy protection, we 
proposed and implemented three additional privacy 
protection methods in iMHere 1.0 and iMHere 2.0 (Bendixen 
et al., 2017; Parmanto, et al., 2015; Parmanto et al., 2013; 
Setiawan et al., 2019). Common to these three new 
methods is that the app is not used to manage a single 
disease but to manage various personal health tasks in 
general via different modules in the mHealth app. Therefore, 
other people around the app user cannot determine the 
user’s purpose for installing and using the app simply from 
the existence of the app on a mobile device or the name of 
the app. Because of this, the privacy protection strength of 
these three new methods is stronger than that of M2.  
Method 3 (M3): The mHealth app has a generic name 
(e.g., iMHere) and there are multiple modules in the app for 
various health care purposes such as medication 
management, skin care, mood assessment, personal health 
record management, exercise and nutrition tracking, and 
goal setting. Users can use any one or combination of these 
modules. All modules are shown in the dashboard of the 
app.  
Method 4 (M4): This method is similar to M3, but with 
the additional feature that app users can easily hide or 
unhide the modules using the settings page of the app. This 
makes M4 stronger than M3 in terms of privacy protection 
strength.  
Method 5 (M5): This method is similar to M4, but 
module changes cannot be performed using the settings 
page of the app; instead they can only be done on the 
secure Web portal associated with the app. App users need 
to go through user authentication on the Web portal before 
they can perform module selection. Once the change is 
made on the Web portal, it is synchronized to the app. M5 
has one more layer of privacy protection (i.e., user 
authentication), making it stronger than M4.  
In M3 – M5, data generated by app users in the 
modules are always stored on a remote secure server. 
Hiding a module will not impact user-entered data, but 
simply make the module not visible or accessible on the 
dashboard of the app.  
Please note that, for the purpose of this project, we 
address only local privacy protection methods. This is 
independent of any examination of data security and remote 
privacy in those mHealth apps.  
STUDY PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT 
AND SCREENING 
After the study protocol was approved by the IRB office 
at the University of Pittsburgh, we recruited study 
participants with the following selection criteria: native 
English speaker, high school or higher education, age 
between 18 and 65, capable of communicating with others 
orally and in writing, has mild or moderate depression, and 
has local privacy concern when using mHealth apps.  
Study participants were recruited through an 
advertisement posted on the Pitt + Me website at the 
University of Pittsburgh. Potential participants could indicate 
their interest in this study by clicking on the link of the study 
on the website. All potential study participants were required 
to fill out a screening questionnaire via the Web-based 
Qualtrics system. Study participants were screened 
according to the aforementioned selection criteria. Study 
invitations were sent via email to each eligible participant.   
During the screening, the severity level of depression 
was measured using the 9-item Patient Health 
Questionnaire (PHQ-9) (Kroenke et al., 2001), where a 
score of 0-4 means no depression, 5-9 means mild 
depression, 10-14 means moderate depression, 15-19 
means moderately severe depression, and 20-27 means 
severe depression. In this study, only those with a PHQ-9 
score between 5 and 14 were screened further for other 
selection criteria. 
We chose people with mild or moderate depression for 
three reasons. First, these people may not have very 
obvious symptoms of depression, making it more likely that 
they would desire to hide this information from others. 
Second, we did not have a psychiatric professional onsite to 
handle emergency situations for people with severe 
depression. Third, it did not make sense to ask people 
without depression to tell us their preferred privacy 
protection method when using depression-related apps. 
We chose people with local privacy concerns when 
using mHealth apps for one reason. That is, if people don’t 
have this type of privacy concern, they don’t perceive the 
need for local privacy protection, and therefore, it does not 
make sense to ask them their preferences with regard to 
local privacy protection methods. If they had any 
preferences, those would be related to other characteristics 
of mHealth apps, such as the usability, accessibility, and 
functionality of the apps, which are not the focus of this 
study. 
DATA COLLECTED DURING THE 
STUDY 
On the questionnaire, the first set of questions (Q1.1-
Q1.8) collected demographic information: age, gender, race, 
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education, marital status, employment status, and 
experience with using smart devices. These questions were 
followed by a question (Q2) about the privacy protection 
methods the study participant had used in the past. 
• Q2. To prevent others around you from finding out 
that you have mental health issues through 
mHealth apps you use, what steps (actions) have 
you taken to protect your privacy? 
The next set of five questions (Q3.1-Q3.5) asked about 
participants’ PPPL for the five methods presented in the 
study. A description of each privacy protection method was 
presented followed by a question to elicit participants’ PPPL 
for that method: 
• Q3.1. In your opinion, what is the privacy protection 
level of this method on a scale of 0 - 10 where 0 
means no protection at all and 10 means the 
strongest protection possible?  
These five questions were used to determine whether 
the study participants had a proper understanding of the 
privacy protection strength of the five methods. In terms of 
PPPL, the expected output overall should be M5 > M4 > M3 
> M2 > M1 since the privacy protection strength is 
determined by the methods themselves. If the results for 
PPPL were not in this order, it meant the participants did not 
fully understand these five methods and their privacy 
protection strength. In this case, their ratings and 
preferences provided in the latter part of the study would 
be problematic.  
The third set of five questions (Q4.1-Q4.5) elicited 
study participants’ preference ratings for the five methods. 
Similar to the previous question set, each privacy 
protection method description was followed by a request to 
rate it on a scale of 1-5, least favorable to most favorable:  
• Q4.1. Please rate this privacy protection method 
on a scale of 1 – 5 where 1 means least favorable 
and 5 means most favorable.  
These five questions were used to determine study 
participants’ preferences for each privacy protection 
method. These ratings were not independent. Each 
participant had to indicate one unique rating (1-5) for each 
method. Therefore, Q4.1-Q4.5 is essentially one question.  
During the interview, the study participants were asked 
the following two questions and their follow-up questions 
for clarification purpose: (1) Please explain the reason for 
your ratings. Typically, the follow-up questions of this 
question were: Why do you prefer this particular method? 
Why do you think this method is not good? (2) Do you have 
any suggestions or comments on privacy protection 
methods in mHealth apps? The follow-up questions of this 
one were: Why do you think this new method is better? Are 
you willing to enter a password every time you want to use 
the module or make changes on modules? Notes were 
taken on study participants’ answers, comments, and 
suggestions and these notes were summarized and 
arranged into themes. 
MHEALTH APPS USED IN THE STUDY 
Multiple mHealth apps were used in this study to 
demonstrate the five privacy protection methods (M1-M5). 
The apps Depression, Depressed, and Depression 
Symptoms were used for the M1 demonstration; MindTools, 
Mood Tracker, and MoodLog were used for the M2 
demonstration. iMHere 2.0 was used for the M3 and M4 
demonstration (Setiawan et al., 2019); and iMHere 2.0 and 
its corresponding Web portal were used for the M5 
demonstration. iMHere 2.0 is an app with multiple modules, 
such as MyMeds for medication management, Mood for 
mood assessment, Skincare for minor skin problem 
reporting, PHR for personal health record management, and 
Exercise and Nutrition for physical activity and nutrition 




Screenshots of iMHere 2.0 Used in the Study 
Note. (a) Icons of apps used for M1 demonstration. (b) Icons 
of apps used for M2 demonstration. (c) A screenshot of 
iMHere 2.0 dashboard. Six modules (MyMeds, Mood, 
Skinacre, PHR, Exercise, and Nutrition) are shown. (d) A 
screenshot of the in-app module selection page in settings 
of iMHere 2.0. Users can turn on or off each individual 
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The focus of the app demonstration was on the local 
privacy protection methods used by the apps, not on their 
usability or functionality. We reminded study participants of 
this focus multiple times during the study (i.e., during the 
study introduction, method demonstration, and interview). 
This was to ensure that the preferences study participants 
expressed were not determined by the quality of the apps 
but by their privacy protection approach. In fact, the apps 
used in this study are all excellent mHealth apps. For 
instance, MoodTools has been rated highly by the Anxiety 
and Depression Association of America. 
DATA ANALYSIS  
Descriptive statistics were calculated for all items on the 
questionnaire. Statistical significance was determined by 
p<.05. The normality of the data was evaluated using the 
Shapiro-Wilk test. A non-parametric test (the Kruskal-Wallis 
test) was used to determine the statistical significance of the 
differences among the five privacy protection methods in 
terms of PPPL. A chi-square test was performed to 
determine the association between the participants’ 
preference rating and the strength of privacy protection 
methods. Statistical analyses were conducted using IBM 
SPSS, version 24. 
A power analysis was performed to determine the 
required sample size. For the mean and mean rank 
comparisons in this study with a hypothesized difference of 
2 and maximum variance of 8, to reach a 95% confidence 
level and 80% power, the recommended sample size was 
32 (Wang & Chow, 2007).  
RESULTS 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
In total, 294 people expressed an interest in this study 
via the Pitt + Me website, 235 of which filled out the 
screening questionnaire. All 235 potential participants 
agreed to provide their information to the research team for 
screening purposes. They all reported being native English 
speakers and being able to speak English fluently. They 
were all aged between 18 and 65 years old. They all had 
received at least a high school level education. 
Of these 235 potential participants, 45 (19.1%) were 
eligible for this study and received a study invitation. Forty-
two (42, 93.3%) of these eligible persons accepted the 
invitation, and 40 (88.9%) attended the study. The major 
reason for non-eligibility for this study was not having local 
privacy concerns (160, 68.1%). Among those eliminated 
who did have local privacy concerns (75, 31.9%), 30 either 
did not have depression or had moderately severe or severe 
depression and therefore were not eligible. 
The 40 participants’ average age was 34.6 (SD=12.13); 
their average PHQ-9 score was 10.5 (SD=2.75), and 
average years of using a smart phone or tablet were 7.6 
(SD=1.97). The study participants’ occupations were highly 
diverse, and included jobs such as administrative assistant, 
administrative coordinator, application development 
manager, chef, computer technician, data analyst, editor, 
homemaker, human resource manager, librarian, medical 
records technician, mover, nanny, personal trainer, research 
assistant, retired person, scientist, software trainer, student, 
and teacher. A summary of further demographic 
characteristics is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  
Demographic Information of the Study Participants (N=40) 
 n % 
Gender   
  Male 18 45.0 
  Female 22 55.0 
Age   
  18-28 13 32.5 
  29-50 22 55.0 
  51-65 5 12.5 
Race   
  Black 4 10.0 
  White 33 82.5 
  Other (1 Asian and 2 Hispanic) 3 7.5 
Severity of Depression   
  Mild 18 45.0 
  Moderate 22 55.0 
Education   
  Up to Associate’s degree 14 35.0 
  Bachelor’s degree 16 40.0 
  Master’s or doctoral degree 7 17.5 
  Professional degree 3 7.5 
Marital Status   
  Single 24 60.0 
  Married or long-term committed 
relationship 
13 32.5 
  Divorced or separated 3 7.5 
Employment   
  Employed 29 72.5 
  Not Employed 5 12.5 
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PRIVACY PROTECTION METHODS USED BY STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
In Q2 of the questionnaire, study participants were asked to indicate the privacy protection methods they already used. 
They could choose one or multiple options or give their own answer. The most frequently selected approach was removing 
browsing history. The next was only using home devices to perform searches. A quarter of participants chose to install and 
then uninstall apps. Several indicated that they very strictly limited the access to their mobile devices. In other words, if the 
mHealth apps they used could not provide the desired privacy protection, users took actions and used various methods on 
their own to protect their privacy. The details are provided in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
Privacy Protection Methods used by Study Participants (N=40)  
Options n % 
Delete Internet browser history after your searches 27 67.5 
Only use home devices to search for health-related information 21 52.5 
Install and uninstall health-related mobile apps 10 25.0 
Other (e.g., limit access to my device very strictly) 5 12.5 
 
During the interview, some study participants also mentioned other privacy protection methods they used on their mobile 
devices. For instance, they arranged their mHealth apps into folders and named them with a common name such as “lifestyle” 
or placed these folders on pages other than the first page of the app list.  
PARTICIPANTS’ UNDERSTANDING OF AND PREFERENCE RATINGS FOR THE FIVE 
METHODS 
Q3.1 – Q3.5 were used to determine study participants’ PPPL for the five privacy protection methods (M1-M5) while Q4.1 
– Q4.5 were used to collect study participants’ preference ratings for the five methods. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics 
of answers to these ten questions. From the values, it is clear that M5 > M4 > M3 > M2 > M1 in terms of both PPPL (M1_P – 
M5_P) and preference rating (M1_R – M5_R), which indicates that study participants had a correct understanding of the 
privacy protection strength of the five methods and had a higher preference for stronger privacy protection methods, 
respectively, even though the stronger methods required completing more steps. Further assessment is necessary to 
determine whether the differences among different methods were statistically significant.  
Table 3  




(0 - no protection,  
10 - strongest protection) 
 Methods Preference Rating: 1 - least favorable, 5 - most favorable 
(n, %) 
 Mean SD   1 2 3 4 5 
M1_P 3.63 2.844  M1_R 35, 87.5% 4, 10.0% 1, 2.5% 0, 0 0, 0 
M2_P 4.75 2.109  M2_R 2, 5.0% 29, 72.5% 6, 15.0% 3, 7.5% 0, 0 
M3_P 5.70 2.564  M3_R 2, 5.0% 4, 10.0% 27, 67.5% 2, 5.0% 5, 12.5% 
M4_P 7.47 1.485  M4_R 0, 0 1, 2.5% 3, 7.5% 23, 57.5% 13, 32.5% 
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To perform further analysis, the normality of PPPL data 
was evaluated using the Shapiro-Wilk test. The results 
indicate that M2_P (p=0.64) and M4_P (p=0.07) were 
normally distributed. The data for all of the others (M1_P, 
M3_P, M5_P) were not normally distributed (p<0.05), 
indicating that when comparing the results for different 
methods, non-parametric tests would be more appropriate.  
To determine whether the differences for the five 
methods in terms of PPPL were statistically significant, the 
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test for multiple group 
comparison was performed. The Krusakl-Wallis H test 
showed that there was a statistically significant difference in 
PPPL between the different privacy protection methods. The 
Kruskal-Wallis H score is 78.016, p < 0.001, with a mean 
rank score of 55.86 for M1, 70.36 for M2, 93.66 for M3, 
132.00 for M4, and 150.61 for M5.  
A chi-square test was performed to determine whether 
the participant indicated preference rating was associated 
with their perceived privacy protection strength. An 
association between the preference rating and the strength 
of privacy protection (M5 > M4 > M3 > M2 > M1) was 
observed, with χ2(16) = 332.500, p < 0.001. The result in 
Table 3 shows that these participants gave higher 
preference ratings to stronger privacy protection methods.  
RATIONALES FOR THE PREFERENCE 
RATINGS 
During the interview, the study participants explained 
the reasons for the preference ratings they assigned to the 
five privacy protection methods. The two major reasons 
expressed for preferring M4 and M5 were (1) that users 
could control the display of those modules either in the app 
or via a Web portal, and (2) that these two methods have 
stronger privacy protection. The following are the comments 
from people who preferred stronger privacy protection 
methods. Please note, the participant IDs were assigned to 
all potential study participants and they were not updated 
after some potential study participants were not eligible for 
the study. Therefore, some labels are bigger than 40.   
• I believe the ability to hide the module is the most 
preferred for me. I do not think the website ones 
would be convenient for me. However, I do think 
the hiding is a feature I need in some way or form. 
Whether it be via website log in or just hidden in 
some way. That’s a feature I need. [participant 17] 
• Most secure was rated as most favorable. 
[participant 44] 
• Modules with explicit naming give away too much 
information. Commonly named apps also have the 
same issue. An app with multiple modules that can 
be made inaccessible in the setting is good but 
using a website seems the most secure. 
[participant 68] 
• It gives me some privacy with little effort. 
[participant 78] 
• Discretion makes it more favorable. [participant 87] 
• I feel like being able to hide modules gives me a 
sense of control. I feel more secure sharing data 
when I don't have to be as concerned that 
someone may access it when I put my phone 
down. [participant 88] 
• I like the ability to control and change my app. 
[participant 158] 
• Greater privacy is preferable. [participant 174] 
• App with multiple modules is simple but still 
provides sufficient protection. [participant 201] 
The major reason for preferring M2 or M3 over M4 or 
M5 is that there are more steps in M4 and M5, and some 
study participants believed that M2 or M3 were good enough 
for their situation. The following are comments from study 
participants who assigned a lower preference rating to M4 
and M5 and higher rating to M2 or M3. 
• I like the idea of the mood tracker being built into 
another app, but I am typically the only one who 
uses my phone and don't think someone will take 
the time to look up the app I use.  While the 
website-controlled toggling is nice for certain 
situations, I am not in that situation. [participant 6] 
• I'd rank the last 3 with same rank if possible. I see 
the multiple module app as an improvement over 
the other two, but do not see much difference in the 
multiple module app options. [participant 125] 
• Too many options or too many steps may dissuade 
me although it is a nice option to have. [participant 
126] 
COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS ON 
PRIVACY PROTECTION METHODS  
During the interview, study participants were asked to 
provide comments and suggestions on privacy protection 
methods. One frequently mentioned approach was to have 
user authentication before accessing the modules in a 
mHealth app instead of making module selections on a Web 
portal. In other words, an alternate version of M5. Following 
is the rationale for this suggestion from study participants.  
• App with website access may be an unnecessary 
feature for some people which adds to complexity 
of privacy situation making it less likely to agree to 
use that app if you do not have significant 
information you need to protect. [participant 201] 
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For the alternate version of M5, some study participants 
suggested adding a password before the module change in 
the settings and some recommended a password or 
fingerprint for modules with sensitive information, all inside 
the app, instead of using a Web portal.   
• Maybe entering a password before getting to 
settings. [participant 6] 
• I think it would be cool to add a password option on 
the modules individually to avoid having to 
hide/unhide modules consistently. It would be my 
ideal version of this app. [participant 17] 
• Add a login for sensitive apps or data. [participant 
98] 
• I like a one-step authentication to get into an app, 
such as fingerprint. [participant 125] 
DISCUSSION 
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS  
mHealth apps can be very helpful in supporting health 
self-management and intervention delivery if people use 
these apps in their own health care. However, some people 
have privacy concerns about mHealth apps and so may 
choose not to use mHealth apps (Atienza et al., 2015; 
Proudfoot et al., 2010). The general goal of this study was to 
examine solutions for local privacy protection issues so that 
people would be more willing to use mHealth apps in their 
health care. The following is a summary of this study’s 
unique contributions.  
First, this study differentiated local and remote privacy 
violations since the solutions to each may be different. 
There are already many methods to prevent remote privacy 
violations, such as data encryption, access control, user 
authentication, and user education. Therefore, this study 
focused specifically on identifying user-preferred 
approaches for preventing local privacy violations when 
people use mHealth apps.  
Second, it is known that different people have different 
levels of privacy concerns about their health information and 
that they may desire different types of privacy protection 
methods (Zhou et al., 2019); therefore, five methods (M1 – 
M5) with different privacy protection strengths were 
presented to study participants so that they could choose 
the one that was most suitable for them. It is also known that 
people consider usability of apps when they choose security 
and privacy features (Smith et al., 2017). Hence, the 
usability of security and privacy features may affect their 
preference for privacy protection methods.  
Third, a mixed-methods approach (i.e., demonstration, 
questionnaire, and interview) was used in this study to 
determine study participants’ understanding of the five 
privacy protection methods, their preferred methods, and the 
reasons behind their preferences. The results from this 
study approach should be more reliable than a Web-based 
questionnaire alone.  
Fourth, two user-preferred privacy protection methods 
for mHealth apps were identified in this study. In these two 
preferred methods, there are two common components: (a) 
the mHealth app is multi-purpose, and different health-
related tasks can be performed via different modules in the 
app; (b) users can hide/unhide modules of the mHealth app. 
The difference between these two methods is the location of 
the module selection: one is in the app (M4) and the other is 
on a Web portal (M5). Study participants offered an 
alternate option for M5, that is, performing user 
authentication before accessing the setting page for module 
selection in the app. Our results indicated that app users 
prefer to use apps with multiple modules designed for 
different purposes. Other people around the users then 
cannot determine the users’ purpose for installing the app 
on their mobile device. The results also indicated that it 
would be even better if the users could customize the 
modules demonstrated in the dashboard of the app as it 
would provide another layer of privacy protection. 
These two user-preferred privacy protection methods 
may be used to solve the dilemma that many people are 
currently facing. That is, they want to use mHealth apps to 
discover more information about their health problems and 
identify resources to keep themselves healthy; at the same 
time, they do not want others around them to know that they 
have those health problems (Goldenberg et al., 2014; Zhang 
et al., 2019). This is especially true for people who have 
health problems without symptoms noticeable to others 
around them but that may be associated with stigma, such 
as mild or moderate mental health issues and HIV infection 
(Goedel et al., 2017; Goldenberg et al., 2014, 2015). More 
specifically, our solution to this dilemma is that the desired 
mental health or HIV prevention/treatment information may 
be implemented as individual modules in a more 
generic and multi-purpose mHealth app, such as iMHere 
2.0 (Setiawan et al., 2019). When users need to use the 
mental health modules or HIV related modules, they can 
choose these modules in the app or on a corresponding 
Web portal. These modules would be shown in the 
dashboard of the app and users can access all the features 
offered by these modules. After they finish using these 
modules, users can hide these modules in the app or on the 
Web portal while their data are stored in an encrypted 
format on a secure server. Other people around these users 
would not know if they have used these modules. This 
approach would satisfy the privacy protection requirement 
for HIV prevention apps described in a study done by 
Goedel et al. (2017): “…, these apps should be designed to 
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appear overtly to be related to HIV prevention. Should 
another individual, for example, see an app explicitly for HIV 
prevention, it could expose an individual to HIV-related 
stigma (if others assume they are HIV-positive) and 
discourage them from using these types of apps.” 
This study was partly motivated by the so-called privacy 
paradox, that some people express their privacy concerns 
but do not take actions to protect their privacy. For instance, 
according to a recent survey conducted by the Pew 
Research Center (2019), 81% of Americans own 
smartphones, and they have used their smartphones to 
access highly sensitive health and financial information. 
While many expressed their security and privacy concerns 
(Zhou et al., 2019; Zhou, et al., 2018), 28% do not even use 
the simplest screen lock on their smartphone (Olmstead & 
Smith, 2017). One possible reason is the inconvenience of 
using the privacy protection measure in practice. This 
motivated us to investigate which privacy protection 
methods users prefer in mHealth apps, which are typically 
the ones that app users identify after they balance the need 
for privacy protection and the usability of the app. 
The finding of this study also indicated that people with 
local privacy concerns can identify the strong privacy 
protection methods (M4 and M5 in this study) if they are 
available. They can balance the usability of the app and 
their privacy protection needs.  
What we (app developers and researchers) need to do 
is to familiarize more people with these privacy protection 
methods and encourage other app developers to adopt user 
preferred privacy protection methods in their apps, which 
may encourage more people to use mHealth apps that deal 
with highly sensitive information. 
The alternate approach suggested by study participants 
for M5, the addition of a user authentication method in M4 to 
access module settings, has both advantages and 
disadvantages. The advantage is that with this approach, all 
changes on the modules could be performed in the mHealth 
app; users would not need to access a separate Web portal 
to make the desired changes on modules. The specific 
implementation of the user authentication would determine 
the disadvantages of this alternate approach. If user 
authentication were required for individual modules, it would 
become tedious to enter passwords for access to each of 
them, especially for modules without highly sensitive 
information such as records about physical activity and 
nutrition. If user authentication is only required on modules 
with sensitive information, this protection itself could violate 
local privacy. That is, others would know the user had used 
the module (e.g., depression, HIV infection, hepatitis) if it 
required authentication. Even if user authentication was 
required only before the module selection page instead of 
individual modules, others would still know the user is hiding 
something, even though they do not know the specific 
content. In other words, requiring user authentication can 
provide protection on the content of the information stored in 
the app, but it cannot prevent local privacy violation. In 
addition, if there was no corresponding Web portal, the user 
would not be able to remotely turn off all the modules if the 
mobile device is lost or stolen.  
This study contributes to the limited literature on local 
privacy protection in mHealth apps. To our knowledge, this 
is the first study to identify user preferred local privacy 
protection methods among multiple ones with varying 
privacy protection strength. 
COMPARISON WITH PRIOR STUDIES  
As mentioned in the previous section, we differentiated 
local and remote privacy violations and specifically identified 
mHealth app user preferred privacy protection methods for 
local privacy protection in this study. In previous studies, 
local and remote privacy violations were not differentiated. 
Authors in previous studies simply asked their study 
participants whether they had privacy concerns. There were 
proposed privacy protection methods in general, but there 
was no method specifically designed for local privacy 
protection. Two frequently mentioned privacy protection 
methods in previous studies were password protection and 
encryption (Goldenberg et al., 2015; Mitchell et al., 2016), 
but these are not sufficient for local privacy protection. After 
all, the existence of a single-purpose app for one disease or 
password protection for an app may be sufficient to trigger a 
local privacy violation.  
LIMITATIONS 
The sample size of this study (N=40) was not large, but 
it was sufficient (≥ 32) for mean and mean rank comparison 
among the five privacy protection methods. In this study, 
study participants needed to see the demonstration of the 
five privacy protection approaches before they could make 
informed decisions. The in-person interview sessions made 
it feasible for us to understand the reasons behind the study 
participants’ preference ratings. Therefore, although the 
sample size is not very big, the results from this study are 
reliable. 
As mentioned in the Methods section, we reminded the 
participants of the study focus multiple times during the 
study. However, it was inevitable that some study 
participants might still choose their preferred privacy 
protection method based on the usability and functionality of 
the demonstrated apps. For instance, a few participants 
mentioned that they liked M3-M5 because the iMHere 2.0 
app could finish many different health-related tasks in one 
mHealth app, even though they reported that that was not 
the only reason for them to have a stronger preference for 
M3-M5. This is a limitation of using different mHealth apps 
to demonstrate the five privacy protection methods. It might 
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be better if we had used the same app for the demonstration 
of all five methods, even though we do not believe this 
approach would have significantly changed the results. After 
all, during the app demonstration for M1 and M2, the major 
focus was the app name, and the first page of these apps, 
not the detailed functionality of the apps. The major 
difference between these apps and iMHere 2.0 is the single 
purpose app vs. module-based multiple purpose app, and 
this is part of the difference we wanted to have in this study. 
Our study indicated that many users preferred module-
based multi-purpose apps, which are both rich in 
functionality and provide better privacy protection. These 
two aspects of this type of app are not separable in terms of 
this type of local privacy protection methods (M3-M5), and 
these three methods are all demonstrated in iMHere 2.0.  
The alternate approach suggested by study participants 
was to add a password in M3 or M4 for protecting modules 
with sensitive information. We believed this approach would 
not be better than M3 or M4 itself. The reason is that the 
password is used to protect the confidentiality of the content, 
while the local privacy violation may occur because of the 
existence of the module. However, this alternate approach 
was not explicitly evaluated in this study. Therefore, we 
could not provide any quantitative results about it. In the 
future, a different implementation of this approach can be 
added into the iMHere 2.0 app, and a similar study can be 
performed to determine whether users have significantly 
stronger preference to this approach, and which specific 
implementation for authentication is the most favorable. 
CONCLUSIONS  
In this study, user preferred privacy protection methods 
were identified. mHealth apps with multiple modules for 
different purposes can provide stronger privacy protection 
than single-purpose apps, and users preferred to use 
privacy protection methods with a module selection option 
available for hiding or unhiding modules with sensitive 
information.  
It is desired that more mobile app developers choose to 
use a module-based approach in their apps, which can 
provide more flexible and user-preferred privacy protection. 
Such module-based apps may encourage more users to 
adopt mHealth apps and better manage their own health.  
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